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FEAR OF COMMITMENT:  
WHY CA, INC. V. AFSCME LEAVES MANDATORY 
ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS UNDISTURBED 
Zachary N. Lupu*
 
 
Fiduciary duties bind a board of directors to manage a corporation in 
the best interests of its shareholders at all times.  The prominence of 
fiduciary duties under Delaware corporate law has led Delaware courts to 
invalidate corporate contracts that would prevent directors from exercising 
their fiduciary duties.  The Delaware Supreme Court extended this doctrine 
to bylaws in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan by invalidating 
a proposed bylaw that would mandate board action in violation of the 
board’s fiduciary duties. 
At the same time, the CA, Inc. decision called into question the continued 
validity of mandatory advancement bylaws.  It is well established in 
Delaware corporate law that corporations may advance the legal expenses 
of directors defending lawsuits related to their service on a corporate 
board.  Moreover, Delaware courts have broadly upheld directors’ 
advancement rights where a corporation has adopted a bylaw mandating 
advancement to the full extent of Delaware law. 
This Note examines the contours of fiduciary duty and advancement 
jurisprudence in Delaware corporate law.  Next, it discusses the perceived 
impact the CA, Inc. decision has had on the enforceability of mandatory 
advancement bylaws.  It then proposes that the Delaware General Assembly 
and stakeholders in Delaware corporations should independently take 
action to protect advancement rights following CA, Inc.  Finally, this Note 
concludes that the CA, Inc. decision will not disturb mandatory 
advancement bylaws in light of the particular standard of review employed 
by the CA, Inc. court and cases relating to advancement bylaws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Marc Hermelin joined the board of directors and became CEO of K-V 
Pharmaceutical Company (KV) in 1975.1  After two pharmacies reported in 
2008 that KV had manufactured and distributed oversized morphine tablets, 
KV’s Audit Committee conducted an internal investigation that culminated 
in Hermelin’s termination.2
Following Hermelin’s departure, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Eastern District of Missouri conducted its own investigation of KV’s error.
 
3  
As a result, Hermelin ultimately pled guilty to two federal strict liability 
misdemeanors, resulting in $1.9 million in fines and forfeitures, and a jail 
term of “30 days or less,” of which Hermelin served fifteen days.4
During Hermelin’s time in the St. Louis County Jail, authorities there 
recorded Hermelin’s conversations with visitors pursuant to the jail’s 
policy.
 
5  A reporter with The St. Louis Post-Dispatch requested access to 
these recordings and to jail records concerning Hermelin’s incarceration to 
continue the Post-Dispatch’s coverage of the imbroglio at KV.6  When 
Hermelin initiated a lawsuit to prevent release of the recordings, the Circuit 
Court of St. Louis County permanently enjoined the release on the ground 
that the conversations were of a private nature.7
Around the time that Hermelin brought suit, his counsel submitted 
invoices to KV for fees relating to the jail records matter with the 
expectation that the board would advance Hermelin’s legal expenses as 
provided under an Indemnification Agreement that was executed in 2008 
 
 
 1. Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., No. 6936, 2012 WL 395826, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 
2012).  KV is a Delaware corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri that markets generic and 
branded pharmaceutical products. See About Us, KV PHARMACEUTICAL, 
http://www.kvpharmaceutical.com/about_us_landing.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  
Hermelin’s father, Victor Hermelin, founded KV in 1942, and the Hermelin family retains 
control over the firm. See Jim Doyle, Federal Target Quits KV Board, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1. 
 2. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *2.  This internal investigation discovered that KV 
had also manufactured additional oversized tablets, including propafenone, an anti-
arrhythmic drug, and dextroamphetamine sulfate, a stimulant. Id.  These drugs could pose 
safety risks if taken in oversized form. Verified Amended Complaint ¶ 21, Hermelin, 2012 
WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2011) (No. 6936), 2011 WL 5128206; Answer of Defendant 
K-V Pharmaceutical Company ¶ 21, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2011) 
(No. 6936), 2011 WL 5617844.  KV notified the FDA of its discovery of the oversized 
morphine sulfate tablets, but it did not report its discovery of the other oversized pills.  
Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *2. 
 3. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *3. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at *5. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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pursuant to KV’s bylaws.8  When KV denied this request, Hermelin filed a 
claim against KV seeking the advancement payments.9
While the agreement at issue did not provide advancement for legal 
action initiated by Hermelin,
 
10 Hermelin argued that he was, in fact, entitled 
to advancement because he had not initiated the matter but instead 
“employed the only defense available to him” under the circumstances.11  
Moreover, Hermelin asserted that his lawsuit represented a compulsory 
counterclaim not excepted under the agreement.12  KV argued that 
Hermelin’s action for an injunction fell squarely within the exceptions to 
Hermelin’s advancement rights under the agreement.13  KV also contended 
that Hermelin’s suit did not qualify as a compulsory counterclaim as 
defined by federal or state law.14
Finding KV’s interpretation persuasive, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
ultimately held that Hermelin was not entitled to advancement because the 
relevant agreement did not afford Hermelin advancement for any “part” of a 
legal proceeding he initiated.
 
15  Furthermore, even if the agreement 
mandated advancement for compulsory counterclaims, Hermelin’s action 
for an injunction fell short of the Court of Chancery Rules’ definition of a 
compulsory counterclaim.16
Had Hermelin’s agreement indeed mandated advancement in this case, 
KV’s counsel might have found it advantageous to pursue the newly viable 
argument that compliance with the agreement’s advancement provision 
would cause the board to violate its fiduciary duties.
 
17  Fiduciary duties 
require that directors act in the best interests of their shareholders.18  Here, 
the board could plausibly argue that it would be gross mismanagement of 
KV shareholders’ wealth to hand over $375,00019
This argument became available in this context following the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension 
 to a former CEO who 
had pled guilty to federal crimes and then sued the jail in which he was 
incarcerated. 
 
 8. Id. at *6–7; see also Defendant’s Opening Brief Opposing Advancement for the Jail 
Records Litigation at 6, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2011) (No. 6936), 
2011 WL 6934085. 
 9. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *5 (“Hermelin seeks advancement for his legal fees 
and expenses in prosecuting an action for injunctive relief against the St. Louis County Jail, 
where Hermelin was incarcerated following his conviction in the Criminal Matter.”). 
 10. Id. at *7 
 11. Id. at *5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at *7. 
 16. Id. at *8 (citing DEL. CT. CH. R. 13(a)). 
 17. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 19. Opening Pre-Hearing Brief of Plaintiff Marc S. Hermelin in Support of His Claim 
for Advancement in the “Jail Records Matter” and in Support of His Claim for Fees-for-Fees 
as to Count I at 2, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2011) (No. 6936), 2011 
WL 6934086. 
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Plan.20  There, the court considered the validity of a proposed bylaw that 
would require a board to reimburse expenses reasonably incurred by 
shareholders in a successful electoral challenge to incumbent directors.21  In 
its decision, the court relied on precedent holding that directors’ fiduciary 
duties always supersede contractual obligations,22 rendering unenforceable 
agreements that interfere with the exercise of fiduciary duties.23  Along 
these lines, the court held the proposed bylaw in CA, Inc. invalid because 
bylaws mandating board action in breach of fiduciary duties are invalid as 
well, unless they contain a “fiduciary out” provision expressly permitting 
the board to exercise its duties.24
Thus, CA, Inc. dictates that a mandatory advancement bylaw lacking a 
fiduciary out is also invalid, as it would require a board to breach its 
fiduciary duties by expending corporate funds to defend a disreputable 
director.
 
25  Inclusion of a fiduciary out would cure this defect, but it would 
also permit a board to avoid a clear obligation to advance, thereby gutting 
the mandatory nature of mandatory advancement bylaws.26
This Note explores the impact of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision 
in CA, Inc. on mandatory advancement bylaws.  Part I first examines how 
directors’ fiduciary duties came to supersede corporate contracts and 
explains the CA, Inc. court’s extension of this doctrine to the bylaw context.  
It then introduces Delaware’s indemnification and advancement regime and 
describes the scope of mandatory advancement bylaws.  Part II explores 
how the CA, Inc. holding conflicts with well-established law that mandatory 
advancement bylaws lacking fiduciary outs are indeed enforceable.  Finally, 
Part III offers two approaches to protect mandatory advancement should 
CA, Inc. render existing mandatory advancement bylaws invalid.  The Note 
concludes, however, that CA, Inc. does not, in fact, invalidate current 
mandatory advancement bylaws due to the standard of review employed in 
CA, Inc., and given Delaware precedent enforcing advancement bylaws 
broadly. 
 
I.  BURDENS AND BENEFITS:  FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND ADVANCEMENT 
RIGHTS 
Part I begins by reviewing corporate directors’ fiduciary duties under 
Delaware law.27
 
 20. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008); infra note 
  Next, it examines Delaware case law invalidating 
302 and accompanying text (noting a Delaware 
Vice Chancellor’s opinion that an argument such as Hermelin’s may be asserted in good 
faith following CA, Inc.); see also infra Part I.5. 
 21. See infra Part I.A.5. 
 22. See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 24. See infra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 288–91 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 27. This Note examines Delaware law because Delaware is the state of incorporation of 
the vast majority of America’s most significant corporations and because its corporate law is 
followed by many other states. See DEL. DIVISION CORPS., http://corp.delaware.gov (last 
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corporate contracts that would preclude directors from exercising their 
fiduciary duties and the extension of this principle in CA, Inc. to mandatory 
bylaws.  It then explains the regime for directorial indemnification and 
advancement under the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).  Part I 
concludes by describing the contours of a director’s advancement 
entitlement pursuant to a mandatory advancement bylaw. 
A.  The Primacy of Fiduciary Duties 
This section briefly discusses the function and substance of directors’ 
traditional and enhanced fiduciary duties.  It then traces a line of decisions 
in which the Delaware Supreme Court struck down agreements that would 
require directors to breach their fiduciary duties.  Next, it explains the origin 
of the requirement that merger agreements contain “fiduciary out” 
provisions to preserve directors’ ability to exercise their duties.  It 
concludes by describing the CA, Inc. court’s decision to invalidate a 
mandatory bylaw because it would interfere with the discharge of fiduciary 
duties. 
1.  The Rationale for Fiduciary Duties 
A defining feature of public corporations in the United States is that their 
ownership and management are independent of each other.28  This 
separation of ownership and control, which Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means famously documented in 1932,29 results from typically dispersed 
networks of shareholders who lack the resources necessary to manage 
corporations collectively.30  As a result, shareholders entrust control of a 
corporation to a board of directors, which commands a broad power to 
manage the corporation’s “business and affairs.”31
Despite their expansive power, directors occasionally face situations 
where they are unsure what course of action is in the best interests of the 
corporation.
 
32
 
visited Feb. 23, 2012) (noting that more than 50 percent of all U.S. publicly traded 
companies and 63 percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware). 
  Moreover, the interests of shareholders and directors are 
 28. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932) (describing a modern corporation as one “in which a large 
measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of 
owners”). See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
 29. See generally Berle & MEANS, supra note 28. 
 30. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law:  The Case 
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 29 (2003) (“[C]onsider the difficulties 
shareholders would face in acting as the public corporation's central decision-makers.  At the 
most basic level, the mechanical difficulties of achieving consensus amongst thousands of 
decision-makers impede shareholders from taking an active role.”). 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (providing that “every [Delaware] 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”). 
 32. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 20, 2005) (illustrating this problem using an example from agency law). 
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often different.33  Indeed, given their power, directors may be tempted to 
act opportunistically, exploiting shareholder wealth for their own gain.34  
This unfortunate prospect gives rise to “agency costs”:  expenses 
shareholders bear to ensure the board acts in shareholders’ best interests.35
As agency costs represent a chief concern of corporate law, identifying 
strategies to mitigate self-serving directorial conduct has become a central 
question of legal scholarship.
   
36  A principal mechanism to address agency 
costs is the imposition of “fiduciary duties” on directors to guide board 
decision making when the optimal course of action is unclear.37  Fiduciary 
duties exist to ensure that directors eschew self-interest and act in the best 
interests of shareholders.38  As a result, Delaware corporate law heavily 
relies on fiduciary duties to reduce agency costs in public corporations.39
2.  The Traditional Duties of Care and Loyalty 
 
Directors’ fiduciary duties have traditionally fallen into two broad 
categories:  the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.40
 
 33. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 
  A director is always 
28, at 6 (noting that the separation of ownership 
and control “produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager 
may, and often do, diverge”); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1433 (1985) (noting the 
potential for “self-dealing or possible self-aggrandizing behavior” by agents, including 
corporate directors). 
 34. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34 
J. CORP. L. 409, 411–12 (2009) (noting that “an incentive exists [for directors] to 
exploit . . . shareholder wealth in the form of higher management salaries, bonuses, and 
perquisites” and that “the risk of [board] exploitation of shareholder wealth and investment 
is great”). 
 35. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining 
agency costs generally as the sum of “the monitoring expenditures by the principal[,] the 
bonding expenditures by the agent[, and] the residual loss”); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 
6 (“Agency costs arise because agents have incentives to shirk, which we might define as 
any action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a 
whole.”). 
 36. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28; Brudney, supra note 33; Fama & Jensen, 
supra note 28; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 35.  
 37. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 20, 2005) (“Fiduciary duties exist in order to fill the gaps in the contractual relationship 
between the shareholders and directors of the corporation.”); see also FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92–93 
(1991) (noting that “the fiduciary principle is a rule for completing incomplete bargains in a 
contractual structure”). 
 38. See Christopher Fawal, Note, Protecting Shareholder Access to Director Elections:  
A Response to CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Urging the Adoption of a Blasius Standard of Review 
for the Exercise of a Fiduciary-Out Clause, 59 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1482 (2010) (describing the 
“logic” of fiduciary duties). 
 39. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 
783 (2011). 
 40. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) 
(holding, despite precedent characterizing directors’ fiduciary duty as a “triad” comprising 
good faith, due care, and loyalty, that there are only two fiduciary duties:  the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty); see also infra note 48 (describing the duty of good faith as a duty 
attendant to the duty of loyalty). 
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expected to act in accordance with these basic duties.41  The duty of care 
requires a director to use an “amount of care which ordinarily careful and 
prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”42  The Delaware 
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that a director must consider all 
material information reasonably available before he makes a business 
decision.43
In cases alleging breach of the duty of care, courts employ the business 
judgment rule, which presumes that a director making a business decision 
“‘acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”
 
44  Indeed, a court 
will presume a director has exercised sound business judgment as long as 
the challenged business decision can be attributed to a rational purpose.45  
Therefore, only conduct amounting to gross negligence comprises a breach 
of the duty of care.46
The duty of loyalty requires a director to refrain from conduct that would 
deny a benefit to the corporation and its stockholders.
 
47  Essentially, the 
duty of loyalty prevents a director from subordinating corporate interests to 
his own through transactions that exploit the corporation.48
In cases alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, courts employ the entire 
fairness standard, which first burdens the plaintiff to establish a director’s 
personal interest in the challenged transaction.
 
49
 
 41. Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment:  An Appraisal of 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 575 (2004) (“[A] director’s good faith 
adherence to the duties of care and loyalty are expected to guide her conduct at all times.”). 
  The burden then shifts to 
the interested director to demonstrate that the terms of the transaction are 
 42. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 43. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a duty to 
inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them.  Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite 
care in the discharge of their duties.”). 
 44. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d 
at 812). 
 45. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A court under 
such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business 
judgment.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981) (noting that 
a director’s failure to read and understand financial statements and to make reasonable 
attempts at detection and prevention of illegal conduct by management constituted a breach 
of her duty of care). 
 47. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) 
(“In short, directors must eschew any conflict between duty and self-interest.”). 
 48. See RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH, & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.1 (4th ed. Supp. I 2006) (noting that the 
duty of loyalty “proscribes a [director] from any means of misappropriation of assets 
entrusted to his management and supervision”).  The duty of loyalty encompasses the 
attendant duty of good faith, which prohibits a “conscious disregard for [directorial] 
responsibilities.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006). 
 49. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (“[I]t is first the burden 
of the plaintiff attacking the [transaction] to demonstrate some basis for invoking the fairness 
obligation.”). 
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intrinsically fair to the corporation.50  This doctrine’s rationale is that a 
director should be an independent corporate decision maker.51  Thus, when 
a director’s conduct falls short of this goal, a court will stand in as an 
objective arbiter both to confirm that the transaction is fair to the 
corporation and to hold the interested director liable when it is not.52
3.  Enhanced Duties in Change of Control and Defensive Circumstances 
 
Given that courts defer to a board’s business judgment unless a director 
has effectively swindled the corporation, most corporate transactions are not 
subject to rigorous judicial review.53  Courts will only scrutinize a board’s 
decision to engage in either (1) a transaction that represents a sale of 
corporate control, or (2) a short-term defensive tactic.54
A sale of control triggers directors’ Revlon duties, which require directors 
to maximize short-term value to shareholders.
 
55  Either a sale of all shares 
for cash56 or a stock-for-stock merger that results in a combined company 
with a majority shareholder57 comprises a sale of control.58  Thus, when 
such transactions are challenged, courts hold directors’ conduct to a 
standard of “immediate shareholder wealth maximization.”59
 
 50. See id. at 710 (“The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where 
one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, 
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”).  The two basic aspects of 
fairness are fair dealing and fair price. Id. at 711. 
 
 51. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993). 
 52. See id.  Nevertheless, section 144 of the DGCL furnishes two methods by which a 
director may cleanse the taint of an unfair, self-interested transaction:  when a director fully 
discloses her interest and a majority of either (1) the disinterested directors, or (2) the 
disinterested shareholders approves the transaction, it is not voidable solely due to the 
director’s interest. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001 & Supp. 2010). 
 53. See Griffith, supra note 41, at 576 (“The business judgment rule shields directors 
from judicial second-guessing for all but the most careless acts, and courts will only consider 
the substantive fairness of a deal when the loyalty of directors is compromised by a conflict 
of interest.”). 
 54. See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2003) (synthesizing rules derived from “classic takeover 
cases”). 
 55. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(Once directors decide to negotiate the sale of a corporation, “the directors’ role change[s] 
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for 
the stockholders at a sale of the company”). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 178–79. 
 57. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 
1993) (explaining that the shareholders in that case “will have no leverage in the future to 
demand another control premium” such that the sale represents their last opportunity to 
monetize their investment fully). 
 58. Notably, there is no sale of control in (1) a stock-for-stock merger resulting in a 
diffusely held combined company, see, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 
10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d on other 
grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), or (2) a merger realizing a board’s long-term strategy, 
see, e.g., Time, 571 A.2d 1140. 
 59. Griffith, supra note 41, at 576. 
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Courts also apply enhanced review when a board adopts a short-term 
device to defend against a hostile takeover bid.60  In such circumstances, 
courts scrutinize the board’s decision under the Unocal standard in an effort 
to protect shareholders from the “omnipresent specter” of board self-
entrenchment.61  Unocal scrutiny requires that directors establish (1) that 
the board reasonably perceived a threat to corporate policy and 
effectiveness,62 and (2) that the defensive measure adopted is proportional 
and reasonable in relation to the threat posed.63  Once a board has satisfied 
this standard, its decision receives the protection of the business judgment 
rule.64
4.  Anti-precommitment Doctrine and the “Fiduciary Out” Requirement 
in Corporate Contracts 
 
In corporate transactions, boards often find it useful to commit in 
advance, or “precommit,” to a particular deal or course of action to 
guarantee certain outcomes and to control perceived risks.65
 
 60. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985); see 
also Justin W. Oravetz, Comment, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain?  The Impact of the 
Omnicare Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805, 809 (2004) 
(“Delaware courts apply the Unocal heightened standard of review when a board of directors 
adopt[s] defensive protection devices in response to a hostile takeover.”).  Notably, Unocal 
analysis is not applied when the defensive measure in question is actually a merger realizing 
the board’s pre-existing strategy. See Griffith, supra note 
  
54, at 1909 n.39 (“[A]s long as the 
target board is not under Revlon and can argue that its [merger] plan pre-dates the 
appearance of the [hostile takeover] bid, Unocal will not force it to deal with unsolicited 
bidders.”). 
 61. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55.  This enhanced duty and attendant judicial review exist 
because a board defending a takeover bid “may be acting primarily in its own interests, 
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.” Id.  Unocal was decided prior to 
Revlon. 
 62. Id. at 955.  A board can satisfy this burden by showing it took action in good faith 
based upon reasonable investigation. Id. 
 63. Id.  In identifying a proportional response, a board must analyze the nature of the 
takeover threat and its effect on the corporation as a whole, including the following factors:  
“[the] inadequacy of the price offered, [the] nature and timing of the offer, questions of 
illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and 
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.” Id.  “Coercive” or “preclusive” 
measures are per se unreasonable, as the board “‘does not have unbridled discretion to defeat 
any perceived threat by any Draconian means available.’” Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 
651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).  A response is 
coercive when it is “aimed at forcing upon stockholders a management-sponsored alternative 
to a hostile offer,” and a response is preclusive if it “deprives stockholders of the right to 
receive [any bid] or precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting 
proxy contests or otherwise.” Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 
(Del. 2003) (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387; Time, 571 A.2d at 1154).  Courts will defer, 
however, to a board that has adopted a defensive measure that falls within a “range of 
reasonableness.” Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388. 
 64. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387–88. 
 65. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law:  The Case 
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2003) (“[P]recommitment strategies 
are useful . . . because they protect against passion and time inconsistency.”).  Planned 
transactions often fall apart for any number of reasons, including one party’s poor business 
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Precommitment strategies also protect against the possibility that a board 
could lose its resolve to execute a farsighted plan as circumstances 
change.66
Nevertheless, common law dictates that a contract is invalid and 
unenforceable if it compels a board to breach its fiduciary duties.
 
67  
Delaware judicial decisions have incorporated this doctrine into the state’s 
jurisprudence as well.68  As a result, in a string of significant cases, the 
Delaware Supreme Court nullified corporate contracts that would 
precommit boards to a course of action—whether commitment to or 
avoidance of a particular deal—when fiduciary duties would demand action 
(or inaction) otherwise.69  Thus, the court curbed use of precommitment 
strategies, adopting instead the rule that boards have an “ongoing duty to 
constantly reevaluate” decisions in light of fiduciary duties.70
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
 
71 a target 
corporation’s board adopted measures to protect a deal with a preferred 
acquirer, including a no-shop provision, a termination fee, and a grant of 
stock options to the acquirer.72  Consistent with these obligations, the board 
refused to negotiate with an intervening bidder that offered a higher bid for 
the target’s shares.73  When the bidder brought suit, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the contract’s provisions were invalid and unenforceable to 
the extent they limited fiduciary duties or prevented the board from 
exercising its Revlon duty to maximize value in a sale of control.74
 
performance, fluctuations in stock price that devalue the assets to be exchanged, fluctuations 
in interest rates that render financing untenable, and intervening bids that call into question 
the deal’s desirability. See Griffith, supra note 
  Thus, 
the court held that provisions that would precommit the target board to a 
54, at 1900. 
 66. Griffith, supra note 41, at 597 (noting that an individual undertaking a 
precommitment strategy “acknowledges that in the future, her preferences will change and 
she will lack the will to carry out her current plans”). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (1981) (“A promise by a fiduciary 
[director] to violate his fiduciary duty or a promise that tends to induce such a violation is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”); see also id. cmt. a (“Directors . . . of a 
corporation act in a fiduciary capacity and are subject to the rule stated in this Section.”).  
 68. See, e.g., McAllister v. Kallop, No. 12856, 1995 WL 462210, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 
28, 1995) (“To the extent that a contract, or a portion of a contract, limits a director’s 
exercise of his fiduciary duties, it is unenforceable.”). 
 69. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 20, 2005) (“Generally speaking, these cases stand for the proposition that a contract is 
unenforceable if it would require the board to refrain from acting when the board’s fiduciary 
duties require action.”). 
 70. Bainbridge, supra note 65, at 20. 
 71. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
 72. Id. at 39.  The no-shop provision provided that the target board would “not solicit, 
encourage, discuss, negotiate, or endorse any competing transaction” unless certain 
circumstances were present. Id. 
 73. Id. at 48 (“The Paramount defendants contend that they were precluded by certain 
contractual provisions, including the No-Shop Provision, from negotiating with QVC or 
seeking alternatives.”). 
 74. See id.; see also supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon 
duties). 
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specific deal despite a superior bid impermissibly infringed on the board’s 
exercise of its fiduciary duties.75
In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro,
 
76 a target board amended 
the corporation’s shareholder rights plan, or “poison pill,”77 so that a newly 
elected board could not redeem the pill for six months after taking office.78  
This delayed redemption provision—known as a “no hand” pill—
represented a measure to protect against a takeover bid calling for Unocal 
analysis.79  When the bidder brought suit, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held the provision invalid and unenforceable because it would prevent a 
future board from redeeming the pill “even under circumstances where the 
[future] board would be required to do so because of its fiduciary duty to 
[its] stockholders.”80
The QVC and Quickturn decisions clearly demonstrate the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s “dim view” of precommitments restricting exercise of 
fiduciary duties.
  By precommitting its successor to pass over a 
potentially desirable takeover bid, the current board would constrain its 
successor from exercising its fiduciary duties, rendering the no hand pill 
void. 
81  Nevertheless, it was not until the Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc.82 decision that the court finally introduced a judicial 
solution to impose flexibility on agreements promising precommitment:  a 
“fiduciary out”83 requirement.84
The corporations in Omnicare assembled two mechanisms to protect the 
merger from competing bids.
 
85
 
 75. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (noting that the target board “squandered” its opportunity 
“to negotiate on the stockholders’ behalf” and to discharge its “obligation to seek the best 
value reasonably available”). 
  First, the board of one of the corporations, 
NCS Healthcare, would submit the deal to its stockholders even if the board 
ultimately decided that the merger was not in the corporation’s best 
 76. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 77. A “poison pill” is defined as “[a] corporation’s defense against an unwanted 
takeover bid whereby shareholders are granted the right to acquire equity or debt securities at 
a favorable price to increase the bidder’s acquisition costs.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 78. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1287. 
 79. Id. at 1289–90. 
 80. Id. at 1292–93. 
 81. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 107 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 82. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 83. See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs:  The What and the Why of an 
Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653 (2000) (“Fiduciary outs are anomalous contract 
provisions that generally provide an escape hatch to a target corporation from performing 
some contractual undertaking meant to advance the closing of an acquisition agreement.”); 
see also infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s 
decision as holding that “[a] merger agreement entered into after a market search, before any 
prospect of a topping bid has emerged, which locks up stockholder approval and does not 
contain a ‘fiduciary out’ provision, is per se invalid when a later significant topping bid 
emerges”). 
 85. See id. at 918. 
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interests.86  Second, two NCS directors—who together owned a majority of 
the company’s voting power—agreed to vote in favor of the merger.87  A 
bare majority of the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated these protective 
measures under the Unocal standard.88  Even though the NCS board 
reasonably perceived a danger to the corporation,89 the court held that the 
measures adopted were unreasonable because they made it virtually 
impossible for a competing proposal to succeed.90
Alternatively, the court held that the merger agreement was invalid and 
unenforceable because it resulted in the board disabling its own ability to 
exercise its fiduciary duties.
 
91  The court observed that contractual 
obligations “must yield to the supervening responsibility” of directors to 
exercise their “unremitting” fiduciary duties on a continuing basis.92  
Accordingly, the court held that the NCS board was required to negotiate a 
fiduciary out clause so that it could exercise its fiduciary duties in case of a 
superior offer, thereby imposing a new requirement on merging 
corporations.93
Fiduciary out provisions allow a corporation “to renege on the 
performance of contractual obligations when the board determines that such 
performance” would violate the board’s fiduciary duties.
 
94
 
 86. Id. at 925.  The parties included this provision as permitted under section 251(c) of 
the DGCL as amended in 1998. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001) (“The terms of 
the agreement may require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or 
not the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that 
the agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.”).  In 
2003, the Delaware General Assembly removed this rule from section 251(c) and moved it 
to new section 146 to expand its application from mergers and consolidations to any matter 
submitted to stockholders. See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to 
the General Corporation Law, § 11, 74 Del. Laws 214 (2003); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 251(c) (Supp. 2010). 
  Accordingly, 
 87. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926. 
 88. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 89. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (noting “the possibility of losing the . . . offer and being 
left with no comparable alternative transaction”). 
 90. See Orman v. Cullman, No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2004) (The devices “accomplished a fait accompli, i.e., they ‘made it ‘mathematically 
impossible’ and ‘realistically unattainable’ for . . . any other proposal to succeed, no matter 
how superior the proposal’” (quoting Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936)). 
 91. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 937. 
 92. Id. at 938–39. 
 93. See id. at 939. 
 94. Fawal, supra note 38, at 1480.  The following no-talk example contains a “fiduciary 
out”: 
  The Target shall not . . . participate in any negotiations or discussions regarding 
any Alternative Transaction; provided, however, that if, at any time prior to the 
adoption of this Agreement by the stockholders of the Target, the Board of 
Directors of the Target determines in good faith, based on advice from outside 
counsel, that the failure to provide such information or participate in such 
negotiations or discussions would result in the breach of the fiduciary duties of the 
Board of Directors of the Target to the Target’s stockholders under applicable law, 
then the Target may . . . furnish information with respect to the Target and its 
subsidiaries . . . pursuant to a customary confidentiality agreement containing 
terms no less restrictive than the terms of the confidentiality agreement entered 
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such provisions are simply a way to reconcile a board’s decisions with its 
underlying duties to shareholders.95  In this way, Omnicare’s holding that a 
corporation can only enter into an exclusive merger agreement if it also 
negotiates a fiduciary out clause allowing the board to “terminate the deal if 
a better one emerges” represents the pinnacle of Delaware’s anti-
precommitment jurisprudence.96
5.  CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan:  
Extending Commitmentphobia to Bylaws 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Employees Pension Plan extends its anti-precommitment jurisprudence to 
the corporate bylaw context.  This section describes the court’s decision in 
CA, Inc. and the limited impact of this decision on subsequent law. 
a.  The Occasion for the Decision 
On March 13, 2008, AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,97 a stockholder 
of CA, Inc.,98 submitted a proposed amendment to CA’s bylaws99 for 
inclusion in proxy materials for CA’s 2008 annual meeting.100
 
into between the Target and the Acquiror . . . and . . . participate in discussions 
regarding such proposal. 
  The 
Griffith, supra note 54, at 1901 n.9 (quoting Panel on Negotiating Acquisitions of Public 
Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 286 (2002) (Appendix F)). 
 95. Fawal, supra note 38, at 1480 (citing Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938–39). 
 96. Sabrina Ursaner, Note, Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” out of Shareholder-Proposed 
Bylaws:  An Analysis of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 479, 500 (2010).  
Notably, the Omnicare decision produced vigorous dissents by Chief Justice Veasey and 
Justice Steele. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939 (3–2 decision) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id. 
at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority adopted “proscriptive rules that 
invalidate or render unenforceable precommitment strategies negotiated between two parties 
to a contract who will presumably, in the absence of conflicted interest, bargain intensely 
over every meaningful provision of a contract after careful cost benefit analysis”).  The 
Omnicare decision also gave rise to a wealth of scholarly commentary and criticism on the 
decision’s impact on the validity of exclusive merger agreements. See generally Bainbridge, 
supra note 65; Griffith, supra note 41; Griffith, supra note 54; Oravetz, supra note 60. 
 97. The AFSCME Employees Pension Plan is associated with the American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees Union. See About AFSCME, AFSCME, 
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 98. Formerly known as CA, Inc. and Computer Associates, CA Technologies is one of 
the world’s largest providers of information technology management software. See About 
Us, CA TECHS., http://www.ca.com/ca/en/about-us.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  CA is a 
Delaware corporation with a twelve-member, non-classified board of directors. See CA, Inc. 
v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008). 
 99. Under the federal rules that govern proxy voting, a company must include bylaws 
proposed by shareholders in its proxy materials when certain conditions are met. See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (addressing “when a company must include a shareholder’s 
[bylaw] proposal in its proxy statement”). 
 100. Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Chairman, AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, to 
Kenneth V. Handal, Exec. V.P., Global Risk & Compliance, & Corp. Sec’y, CA, Inc., 1 
(Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter McEntee Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
2008/ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf.  This letter appears as Annex A to CA’s No-Action Request. See 
Letter from David B. Harms, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of 
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proposed bylaw would have required CA to reimburse the reasonable 
expenses incurred by shareholders whose candidates were successfully 
elected to CA’s board of directors.101  According to the proposal’s 
supporting statement, AFSCME proposed the reimbursement bylaw 
because the shareholders’ power to elect the CA board is “the most 
important mechanism” to ensure that the board manages CA in its 
shareholders’ interests, and because reimbursement encourages electoral 
challenges to the incumbent board.102
As a result of AFSCME’s proposal, CA’s counsel sent a letter to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance 
seeking a no-action letter confirming that the SEC would not recommend 
enforcement action against CA if CA excluded the proposal from its proxy 
materials for non-conformity with the proxy rules.
 
103  CA sought to exclude 
AFSCME’s bylaw proposal on four grounds pursuant to the proxy rules:  
(1) that the proposal related to a director nomination or election;104 (2) that 
the proposal was not a proper subject for shareholder action;105
 
Corp. Fin., SEC at enclosure (Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter CA No-Action Request], available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf. 
 (3) that the 
 101. The text of AFSCME’s proposed bylaw was: 
  RESOLVED, that pursuant to section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law and Article IX of the bylaws of CA, Inc., stockholders of CA hereby amend 
the bylaws to add the following Section 14 to Article II: 
  The board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a stockholder or 
group of stockholders (together, the “Nominator”) for reasonable expenses 
(“Expenses”) incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a 
contested election of directors to the corporation’s board of directors, including, 
without limitation, printing, mailing, legal, solicitation, travel, advertising and 
public relations expenses, so long as (a) the election of fewer than 50% of the 
directors to be elected is contested in the election, (b) one or more candidates 
nominated by the Nominator are elected to the corporation’s board of directors, (c) 
stockholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors, and (d) the 
election occurred, and the Expenses were incurred, after this bylaw’s adoption. 
The amount paid to a Nominator under this bylaw in respect of a contested election 
shall not exceed the amount expended by the corporation in connection with such 
election. 
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229–30; see also McEntee Letter, supra note 100, at enclosure. 
 102. McEntee Letter, supra note 100, at enclosure. 
 103. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 1.  CA enclosed the opinion of its 
Delaware counsel, Richard, Layton & Finger P.A., supporting CA’s assertion that the 
proposal, if implemented, would violate Delaware law. See Letter from Richards, Layton & 
Finger P.A. to CA, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf.  The letter appears as Annex B to CA’s No-Action Request. See CA 
No-Action Request, supra note 100, at enclosure. 
 104. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 3–6; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(8) (2008) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal relates to a nomination or an election 
for membership on the company’s board of directors . . . or a procedure for such nomination 
or election”). 
 105. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 6–8; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(1) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal is not a proper subject for action by 
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s organization”). 
1774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
proposal, if implemented, would cause CA to violate applicable law,106 
and; (4) that the proposal ran contrary to the proxy rules.107
In reply, AFSCME’s counsel stated that CA failed to meet its burden to 
authorize exclusion under each basis claimed in its no-action request.
 
108  
CA’s counsel responded that the claimed bases for exclusion remained 
valid and that AFSCME’s reply failed to address CA’s concerns about the 
proposed bylaw.109  The SEC rejected CA’s claims that the proposal related 
to an election and ran contrary to the proxy rules, ultimately finding that 
CA could not properly exclude the proposal on these grounds.110
In addition, the SEC certified the remaining grounds for exclusion to the 
Delaware Supreme Court “to secure [the court’s] determination of 
significant questions of Delaware corporation law, and thereby assist the 
[SEC] in applying [the applicable proxy rules] to CA’s no-action request 
and to similar requests in the future.”  To this end, the SEC’s General 
Counsel submitted two certified questions of law regarding the proposed 
bylaw’s status under Delaware law,
 
111 which the court accepted.112
 
 106. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 
  The 
two questions were:  “(I) Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for 
action by shareholders as a matter of Delaware law?  (II) Would the 
100, at 6–8; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(2) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to 
violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject”). 
 107. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 8–9; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(3) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal . . . is contrary to any of the Commission’s 
proxy rules”). 
 108. Letter from Charles Jurgonis, Plan Sec’y, AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, to Office 
of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 1–5 (May 21, 2008) [hereinafter AFSCME No-
Action Response], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-b.pdf.  
AFSCME enclosed the opinion of its Delaware counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., discussing 
why the proposed bylaw was indeed proper and would not violate Delaware law if 
implemented. See Letter from Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. to Gerald W. McEntee, Chairman, 
Pension Comm., AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan (May 16, 2008) [hereinafter G & E 
Opinion], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-b.pdf.  The letter 
appears as Exhibit A to AFSCME’s No-Action Response. See AFSCME No-Action 
Response, supra, at enclosure. 
 109. Letter from David B. Harms, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Office of Chief Counsel, 
Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
ca14a8cert_att-c.pdf. 
 110. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *1 (June 27, 2008). 
 111. SEC, Cert’n of Questions of Law Arising from Rule 14a-8 Proposal by S’holder of 
CA, Inc. at 2, ¶ 1(i) (June 27, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Certification], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf.  A recent amendment to the Delaware 
Constitution authorized the Delaware Supreme Court to hear questions of law certified by 
the SEC. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); An Act Concurring in a Proposed Amendment to 
Article IV, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897, as Amended, Relating to 
Certification of Questions of Law to the Supreme Court, § 1, 76 Del. Laws 34 (2007); see 
also DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(a)(ii) (authorizing the certification procedure).  The CA, Inc. 
decision was the first time in which the SEC utilized this new certification. See Letter from 
Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, to Clerk, Sup. Ct. of Del. (June 27, 2008), 
available at http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/sec-governance-
ca-letter-cartwright.pdf. 
 112. Order Accepting Questions Certified from the SEC, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. 
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (No. 329, 2008). 
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AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate any Delaware law to 
which it is subject?”113
b.  The First Certified Question:  AFSCME’s Proposed Bylaw Is a Proper 
Subject for Shareholder Action 
 
As a threshold matter, the relative powers of CA’s board and 
shareholders to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.114  The court noted that 
section 109(a) of the DGCL empowers both shareholders and directors of 
Delaware corporations to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws,115 and that 
CA’s certificate of incorporation confers such power on CA’s board 
pursuant to section 109(a),116 with the result that both CA’s shareholders 
and directors hold this power “independently and concurrently.”117
Even though the bylaw power of shareholders is “legally sacrosanct,”
 
118 
the court stipulated that shareholders still do not share an “identical and 
coextensive” power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws with the board of 
directors, given the broad grant of managerial power to the board under 
DGCL section 141(a).119  Indeed, a cardinal precept of Delaware law is that 
directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.120  A board’s management prerogatives therefore necessarily 
check shareholders’ bylaw power.121
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the precise task 
before it was to delineate the “scope of shareholder action that Section 
109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors’ power to 
manage [the corporation] under Section 141(a),”
 
122 and to determine 
whether AFSCME’s proposed bylaw actually falls within that permissible 
scope.123
To this point, CA asserted that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw must fall 
outside the scope of permissible shareholder action because it would restrict 
 
 
 113. SEC Certification, supra note 111, at 4. 
 114. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231–33. 
 115. Id. at 231 (“‘[T]he power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
stockholders entitled to vote . . . ; provided, however, any corporation may, in its certificate 
of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.’” 
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a))). 
 116. CA, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation art. VII, § 2 (Mar. 8, 2006) (“[T]he 
power to make, alter, or repeal, the By Laws, and to adopt any new By Law . . . shall be 
vested in the Board of Directors.”).  CA’s restated certificate of incorporation appears as 
exhibit 3.3 to CA’s Form 8-K filed March 6, 2006. See CA, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
exhibit 3.3 (Mar. 6, 2006). 
 117. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231. 
 118. Id. at 232 (noting that shareholders’ bylaw power cannot be “non-consensually 
eliminated or limited by anyone other than” the Delaware General Assembly). 
 119. Id. (“‘The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .’” (quoting DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a))). 
 120. Id. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 234. 
 123. Id. at 232. 
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the board’s authority to decide whether to reimburse, and DGCL section 
102(b)(1) provides that any such limitation on the board’s power must 
appear in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, not in its bylaws.124  
The court rejected this argument,125 however, in favor of AFSCME’s 
contention that section 109(b) permits bylaws relating to shareholders’ 
rights, and AFSCME’s proposed bylaw would relate to shareholders’ right 
to participate in the director election process.126
Acknowledging that it could not capably “articulate with doctrinal 
exactitude a bright line” that divides valid and invalid shareholder bylaws, 
the court suggested that proper bylaws may “define the process and 
procedures” for board decision making without mandating “specific 
substantive business decisions.”
 
127  As such, the court ultimately framed the 
first certified question as whether AFSCME’s proposed bylaw either 
“establishes or regulates” a process for director decision making or 
mandates the decision itself.128
The court observed that a bylaw that “requires the expenditure of 
corporate funds does not, for that reason alone, become automatically 
deprived of its process-related character.”
 
129  Therefore, the court found 
that it must look to the bylaw’s context and purpose in determining whether 
it is process-related.130  With respect to AFSCME’s proposed bylaw, the 
context was the director election process, in which shareholders have a 
“legitimate and protected interest,”131 while the purpose was to promote the 
integrity of that process by facilitating shareholder participation.132
 
 124. Id. at 233–34 (The certificate of incorporation may contain “‘[a]ny provision for the 
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any 
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the 
directors and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders’” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 102(b)(1))). 
 
 125. See id. at 234 (observing that CA’s argument, “taken to its logical extreme,” would 
eliminate shareholders’ rights to adopt bylaws altogether). 
 126. See id. at 233; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2001) (“The bylaws may 
contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers 
or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”). 
 127. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234–35.  The court also pointed to certain sections of the 
DGCL as examples of proper bylaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 2010) 
(bylaws setting number of directors and establishing board quorum and voting 
requirements); id. § 141(f) (bylaws precluding board action without meeting); id. § 211(a)–
(b) (2001) (bylaws to establish date and location of annual stockholders meeting); id. 
§ 211(d) (2001) (bylaws specifying the conditions for calling special stockholders meetings); 
id. § 216 (Supp. 2010) (bylaws establishing stockholders meeting quorum and voting 
requirements); id. § 222 (Supp. 2010) (bylaws regulating notice requirements for adjourned 
stockholders meetings). 
 128. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 235. 
 129. Id. at 236. 
 130. Id. at 236–37. 
 131. Id. at 237 & n.21 (“‘Delaware courts have long exercised a most sensitive and 
protective regard for the free and effective exercise of voting rights.’” (quoting Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988))). 
 132. Id. 
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Though AFSCME “infelicitously couched [its proposal] as a substantive-
sounding mandate,” the bylaw’s procedural nature would have been clear 
had its language emphasized shareholders’ entitlement to reimbursement 
rather than the board’s obligation to reimburse.133  Thus, the court answered 
the first certified question affirmatively, holding that AFSCME’s proposed 
bylaw was indeed a proper subject for shareholder action.134
c.  The Second Certified Question:  AFSCME’s Proposed Bylaw Would 
Cause the CA Board to Violate Delaware Law 
 
Having determined that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw would comply with 
the DGCL and CA’s certificate of incorporation, the Delaware Supreme 
Court observed that the second certified question before it was whether the 
bylaw would violate Delaware decisional law.135  Moreover, since CA’s 
challenge preempted the bylaw’s adoption, this issue failed to present the 
court with a concrete application of the bylaw to a specific set of facts, 
which would ordinarily inform the court’s analysis.136  Because the second 
certified question demanded “a determination of the validity of the [b]ylaw 
in the abstract,” the CA, Inc. court recognized that it must consider the 
bylaw’s validity in “any possible circumstance under which a board of 
directors might be required to act.”137
As a result, the court concluded that the board’s compliance with the 
bylaw would breach its fiduciary duties in at least one “hypothetical,” 
thereby rendering the bylaw invalid under Delaware law.
 
138  Specifically, a 
board may properly reimburse shareholders’ reasonable proxy expenses 
when a proxy contest139 is based upon a “question of policy as 
distinguished from personnel o[r] management.”140  Nevertheless, when the 
election is driven by “personal or petty concerns,” or to promote interests 
that may be injurious to the corporation, the board’s fiduciary duties 
“compel that reimbursement be denied altogether.”141  Thus, the court held 
AFSCME’s proposed bylaw invalid in line with its prohibition against 
contracts committing the board to action in breach of its fiduciary duties.142
 
 133. Id. at 235, 236 n.20. 
 
 134. Id. at 237. 
 135. Id. at 238. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. A “proxy contest” is defined as a “struggle between two corporate factions to obtain 
the votes of uncommitted shareholders” that usually occurs “when a group of dissident 
shareholders mounts a battle against the corporation’s managers.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 1346. 
 140. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240 (alteration in original) (citing Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight 
Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934)); cf. Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 
457 A.2d 339, 345 (Del. 1983) (permitting reimbursement of proxy expenses where the 
proxy contest “was actually one involving substantive differences about corporation 
policy.”). 
 141. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 142. Id. at 238 (citing Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)). 
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To reach its holding, the Delaware Supreme Court relied heavily on its 
QVC143 and Quickturn144 merger and takeover decisions as precedent in 
support of its reasoning.145  In QVC, the court voided a merger agreement’s 
“no-shop” provision to prevent a board from intervening bids;146 in 
Quickturn, the court invalidated a “no hand” pill that would preclude a 
board’s successor from redeeming its poison pill for six months.147  
Without comment on the dissimilarities of these cases to CA, Inc., the court 
held them up as examples in which the court “invalidated contracts that 
would require a board to act or not act in such a fashion that would limit the 
exercise of their fiduciary duties.”148  Moreover, the court found two 
specific issues irrelevant to its analysis:  (1) that CA’s shareholders (and not 
the board itself) would bind the board through the proposed bylaw,149 and 
(2) that the proposed bylaw would effectively relieve the board of its duties 
concerning the decision to reimburse.150  Put simply, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that QVC and Quickturn were controlling, despite 
factual differences with CA, Inc., because AFSCME’s proposed bylaw 
amounted to an internal governance contract that would mandate 
reimbursement even “in circumstances that a proper application of fiduciary 
principles could preclude.”151
Nevertheless, the court urged in its conclusion that AFSCME’s proposed 
bylaw would be valid if it contained a fiduciary out provision reserving to 
CA’s directors “full power to exercise their fiduciary duty” in 
reimbursement decisions.
 
152  The court also suggested, perhaps less 
vigorously, that AFSCME seek to amend CA’s certificate of incorporation 
to include the proposed bylaw’s substance, or to encourage the Delaware 
General Assembly to amend the DGCL to authorize proxy expense 
reimbursement bylaws.153
 
 143. QVC, 637 A.2d at 34; see supra notes 
  Without a fiduciary out, however, the court held 
71–74 and accompanying text. 
 144. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291–92; see supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 145. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39. 
 146. Id. at 238 (citing QVC, 637 A.2d at 51); see also supra notes 71–74 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39 (citing Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291–92) see also 
supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 148. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238. 
 149. See id. at 239 (characterizing this as a “distinction . . . without a difference”). 
 150. See id. at 239–40 (characterizing this argument as more “semantical than 
substantive” and as conceding “the very proposition” that renders the bylaw invalid). 
 151. Id. at 239–40.  Given the Delaware Supreme Court’s reliance on QVC and 
Quickturn, it seems unusual that the Court failed to mention its related decision in Omnicare, 
which originated the fiduciary out requirement that the court ultimately extended to 
mandatory bylaws in CA, Inc.  One commentator who noticed this omission hypothesized 
that the court did not rely or cite Omnicare in its CA, Inc. decision due to the “considerable 
backlash and criticism” that the Omnicare decision produced. Ursaner, supra note 96, at 
500–01; see also supra note 96 (describing Omnicare’s dissenting opinions and subsequent 
commentary). 
 152. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 153. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (Supp. 2010) (establishing that both 
the board of directors and a majority of stockholders must approve any amendment to a 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation). 
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that the bylaw, if implemented, would indeed violate Delaware law, 
answering the second certified question in the affirmative.154
d.  CA Inc.’s Modest Impact on Delaware Law 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. has been a subject of 
considerable analysis.155
In the years following the CA, Inc. decision courts have only cited that 
case as authority in support of rudimentary points of Delaware law.  CA, 
Inc. has been cited in subsequent cases to buttress the following 
propositions:  (1) de novo review is the appropriate standard of review for a 
certified question of law;
  Nonetheless, CA, Inc.’s impact on Delaware 
decisional and statutory law has been quite limited in the years following 
the decision. 
156 (2) a board whose certificate of incorporation 
has conferred the power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws pursuant to 
section 109(a) of the DGCL may adopt a bylaw as long as the bylaw is 
valid under Delaware law;157 (3) shareholders’ statutory power to amend 
bylaws is not coextensive with the board’s concurrent bylaw power and is 
limited by the board’s management prerogatives;158 and (4) bylaws 
represent a contract between a corporation and its shareholders.159
Notwithstanding the limited reach of CA, Inc.’s influence on subsequent 
case law, the Delaware General Assembly adopted statutory reforms in 
2009 to codify the Delaware Supreme Court’s answer to CA, Inc.’s first 
certified question by expressly authorizing shareholder-proposed bylaws to 
regulate the director election process.
  Thus, 
the CA, Inc. decision has had limited influence on subsequent case law, and 
this case law has failed to interpret the CA, Inc. decision’s impact on other 
mandatory bylaws. 
160  To this end, the new section 113 
of the DGCL161 permits Delaware corporations to adopt a proxy expense 
reimbursement bylaw.162
 
 154. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 
 155. See infra Part II.B. 
 156. See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 436, 
438 n.3 (Del. 2011) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 
2006 Ins. Trust ex rel. Christiana Bank & Trust Co., 28 A.3d 1059, 1064 n.3 (Del. 2011) 
(citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231); Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 281 n.8 (Del. 2010) 
(citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231). 
 157. See Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 157 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d 
at 231–32) (concerning a bylaw amendment purporting to reduce the size of the board). 
 158. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 5377, 2010 WL 2705147, at *10 & 
n.12 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2010) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 232) (finding that Delaware law 
calls for a “consistently board-centric approach” in cases of controller tender offers). 
 159. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing CA, Inc., 
953 A.2d at 239) (considering the enforceability of a venue provision in a corporation’s 
bylaws). 
 160. See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General 
Corporation Law, §§ 1–2, 77 Del. Laws ch. 14 (2009), available at http://delcode.delaware.
gov/sessionlaws/ga145/Chp014.pdf. 
 161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (Supp. 2010). 
 162. See Michael Tumas & John Grossbauer, Amendments to the Delaware Corporation 
Code, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 28, 2009, 4:24 
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Notably, section 113 does not require that a proxy expense 
reimbursement bylaw contain a fiduciary out provision for directors, as CA, 
Inc. required of AFSCME’s proposed bylaw.163  Nevertheless, it seems 
likely that a court interpreting section 113 may decide that the CA, Inc. 
decision implicitly requires some fiduciary out provision.164
B.  Mandatory Advancement Bylaws 
 
This section begins by introducing the policies underlying Delaware’s 
permissive indemnification and advancement regime.  Next, it describes 
directors’ statutory entitlement to indemnification and advancement.  It then 
examines the relationship between directors’ indemnification and 
advancement rights.  Part I.B concludes by explaining the difficulty posed 
by mandatory advancement bylaws, and describing the contours of 
directors’ advancement entitlement under such bylaws. 
1.  Indemnification and Advancement Under DGCL Section 145 
Along with fiduciary duties, directors’ entitlements to indemnification of 
liabilities and to advancement of legal defense expenses comprise another 
important aspect of corporate law.165  Section 145 of the DGCL serves as 
the statutory basis for corporate indemnification and advancement in 
Delaware.166
Delaware courts have recognized that indemnification and advancement 
jointly serve two discrete objectives:  (1) attracting competent directors and 
officers, and (2) encouraging these managers to resist legal action perceived 
 
 
PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/02/28/proposed-amendments-to-the-
delaware-general-corporation-law-2/.  In the same statute, the Delaware General Assembly 
also amended the DGCL to include a new section 112, which authorizes Delaware 
corporations to adopt a “proxy access” bylaw granting stockholders the right to include in 
the corporation’s proxy materials stockholders’ nominees for directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 112; see also Tumas & Grossbauer, supra. 
 163. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with 
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 158 (2011). 
 164. See id.  Given the apparent significance of the CA, Inc. decision and its subsequent 
codification in section 113, it is notable that Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery remarked in the lone decision to comment on section 113 since 
its adoption that the new amendments “ma[de] plain that which had always been understood 
by most Delaware corporate lawyers.” Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 
310, 356 n.244 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting the shareholder plaintiff’s argument that sections 
112 and 113 represented a policy shift that should have invalidated the poison pill at issue in 
that case). 
 165. See, e.g., Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability:  Advancement 
of Legal Expenses, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2004, at 5 (explaining that indemnification and 
advancement, along with directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and DGCL § 102(b)(7), 
represent “a cornerstone of the effort to reduce the risk of personal liability arising out of 
board conduct”).  Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL authorizes a provision in a corporation’s 
certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit the liability of directors for damages 
resulting from non-intentional, non-bad faith breaches of duty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain . . . [a] provision 
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its 
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.”). 
 166. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001 & Supp. 2010). 
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to be meritless.167  While courts construe bylaws furnishing indemnification 
and advancement using established rules of contract interpretation, they 
“simultaneously apply the patina of section 145’s policy” in their 
decisions168 and must “eschew narrow construction of [section 145] where 
an overliteral reading would disserve these policies.”169
Moreover, Delaware courts have observed that indemnification and 
advancement actually benefit the corporation more than the director.  A 
liberal corporate indemnification and advancement policy eliminates “the 
chilling effect of potential personal liability” on the part of directors, 
thereby encouraging the flexible board decision making and prudent risk 
taking that benefits all corporate constituencies.
 
170  Thus, indemnification 
and advancement do not represent an “individual benefit arising from 
personal employment [but the] desirable underwriting of risk by the 
corporation in anticipation of greater corporate-wide rewards.”171
2.  Indemnification of Directors’ Liabilities 
 
Section 145 authorizes a corporation to indemnify172 its directors for 
certain specified liabilities depending on the type of action brought against 
the director.173  When a shareholder brings a direct action against a 
corporate director,174 section 145(a) permits a corporation to indemnify a 
director for attorney’s fees and any judgments, fines, or settlement amounts 
the director actually and reasonably incurs.175  To qualify for 
indemnification in a particular case, the director must have acted in good 
faith and for a purpose she reasonably believed to be in the corporation’s 
best interests.176
 
 167. VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (noting that Delaware 
courts “have long recognized that section 145 serves the dual policies of:  (a) allowing 
corporate officials to resist unjustified lawsuits, secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated, 
the corporation will bear the expense of litigation; and (b) encouraging capable women and 
men to serve as corporate directors and officers, secure in the knowledge that the corporation 
will absorb the costs of defending their honesty and integrity” (citing Hibbert v. Hollywood 
Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344 (Del. 1983))). 
  Notably, termination of a direct action by judgment or 
 168. Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003, 2008 WL 868108, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008). 
 169. VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 84. 
 170. Scharf v. Edgcomb Corp., No. 15224, 1997 WL 762656, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 
1997) (“Analyzing director and officer indemnification provisions as if they were salary, 
company cars or other personal corporate prerequisites [sic] simply makes no sense.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. “Indemnification” is defined as “[t]he action of compensating for loss or damage 
sustained” and, alternatively, “compensation so made.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 77, at 837. 
 173. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2001). 
 174. A “direct action” is defined as “[a] lawsuit to enforce a shareholder’s rights against a 
corporation,” to which a director may be joined as a defendant. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 77, at 525–26. 
 175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (“A corporation shall have power to indemnify any 
person [in] any . . . suit or proceeding . . . (other than an action by or in the right of the 
corporation) by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director . . . against expenses 
(including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement . . . .”). 
 176. Id. 
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settlement does not by itself suggest that the director has failed to satisfy 
this standard of conduct.177
Section 145(b) authorizes a much narrower indemnification right in 
derivative actions,
 
178 affording indemnification only for expenses actually 
and reasonably incurred, such as attorney’s fees.179  While the entitlement 
requires the same standard of directorial conduct required in direct 
actions,180 section 145(b) does not afford indemnification for settlements 
and judgments, as a director defending a derivative suit has allegedly 
breached his fiduciary duties.181  Despite this limitation, section 145(g) 
permits insurance to cover such non-indemnifiable amounts.182
Indemnification of corporate directors is not self-executing; instead, 
indemnification requires a determination that the director’s conduct 
qualifies under section 145’s standard.
 
183  Section 145 provides that such 
determination may be made as follows:  (1) by a majority vote of directors 
who are not parties to the pertinent proceeding, even if less than a quorum 
of the board; (2) by a committee of such non-defendant directors designated 
by a majority of such directors, even if less than a quorum; (3) if there are 
no non-defendant directors, or if such directors elect, by independent legal 
counsel in a written opinion; or, (4) by a majority of the stockholders.184
Nevertheless, section 145 also dictates that corporations must indemnify 
directors in certain circumstances.
 
185  Specifically, indemnification is 
mandatory when a director has been “successful on the merits or otherwise” 
in defense of any proceeding described in the statute, regardless of whether 
his conduct satisfies the standard.186
3.  Advancement of Directors’ Litigation Expenses 
 
In addition to indemnification for liabilities, section 145 also authorizes 
advancement:  corporate payment of a defendant director’s litigation 
expenses (i.e., attorneys’ fees), which the director must repay if such 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. A “derivative action” is defined as “a suit asserted by a shareholder on the 
corporation’s behalf against a third party [the director] because of the corporation’s failure to 
take some action against the [director].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 509. 
 179. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b). 
 180. See id.; see also supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 181. McLaughlin, supra note 165.  In contrast, a director defending a direct suit may 
reasonably expect “broad corporate reimbursement” because she presumably acted in the 
best interests of the corporation in injuring the plaintiff. Id. 
 182. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (“A corporation shall have power to purchase 
and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director . . . against any 
liability asserted against such person and incurred by such person . . . whether or not the 
corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such liability under this 
section.”). 
 183. See McLaughlin, supra note 165. 
 184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (Supp. 2010). 
 185. See id. § 145(c) (2001). 
 186. Id. 
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expenses are ultimately deemed non-indemnifiable.187  Advancement, 
which is an “especially important corollary” to indemnification in attracting 
talented directors, provides “immediate interim relief from the personal 
out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses 
inevitably involved” with litigation defense.188
Like its grant of indemnification, Delaware’s scheme for advancement is 
best characterized as permissive.
 
189  Corporations enjoy broad flexibility in 
specifying the terms and conditions upon which directors may receive 
advancement (such as a proof of ability to repay or posting of a secured 
bond).190  Unlike indemnification, advances to a director do not require a 
determination that his conduct has met a minimum standard.191
While section 145 conditions advancement to current directors on an 
“undertaking” that the director repay the corporation if advanced expenses 
are ultimately ineligible for indemnification, the statute fails to “prescribe a 
standard of solvency, require collateral, or specify minimum financial 
requirements.”
 
192  Moreover, section 145 does not impose any conditions 
on advances to former directors.193
Although section 145 does not require corporations to advance legal 
expenses, “a great many corporate charters, bylaws and [private] 
indemnification agreements” include mandatory advancement 
 
 
 187. Id. § 145(e) (Supp. 2010) (“Expenses (including attorneys’ fees) incurred by . . . [a] 
director of the corporation in defending any . . . suit or proceeding may be paid by the 
corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action . . . upon receipt of an 
undertaking by or on behalf of such director . . . to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be 
determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation . . . .”). 
 188. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005). 
 189. See Richard A. Rossman, Matthew J. Lund & Kathy K. Lochman, A Primer on 
Advancement of Defense Costs:  The Rights and Duties of Officers and Corporations, 85 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 34 (2007) (“[A]dvancement statutes of most states are described as 
‘permissive’ because they establish only the ability of a corporation to grant advancement.”). 
 190. See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; see also Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 
111, 113 (Del. 2001) (holding that a corporation did not provide for advancement to the 
broadest extent possible under the law but limited advancement to certain situations). 
 191. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability:  Consider the 
Implications of Mandatory Advancement, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 14, 2008, at 5 
(“Advancement . . . ordinarily is not conditioned on a finding that the party seeking 
advancement has met any standard of conduct.”). 
 192. Regina Robson, Paying for Daniel Webster:  Critiquing the Contract Model of 
Advancement of Legal Fees in Criminal Proceedings, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 280–81 
(2011); see, e.g., Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992) 
(“This undertaking [for advancement] need not be secured.”).  Thus, any unsecured 
undertaking by a director accused of criminal wrongdoing is “particularly hollow” because a 
guilty verdict will not only render her advances ineligible for indemnification but will also 
likely deprive her of adequate resources to repay the funds advanced. Robson, supra, at 280–
81. 
 193. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 2010) (“Such expenses (including 
attorneys’ fees) incurred by former directors . . . may be so paid upon such terms and 
conditions, if any, as the corporation deems appropriate.”); see also Homestore, 888 A.2d at 
211 (“Section 145(e) provides corporations with the flexibility to advance funds to former 
corporate officials . . . without an express undertaking.”). 
1784 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
provisions.194  Such provisions often reproduce section 145’s language, 
thereby granting an advancement entitlement “to the fullest extent of the 
law.”195  Where a mandate is in place, a director’s right to advancement is 
enforceable as under a contract.196  Moreover, section 145 imposes no limit 
on the amount of corporate funds to be advanced under mandatory 
provisions.197
Section 145 vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions for advancement.
 
198  The scope of an advancement 
proceeding is typically summary in nature,199 reflecting the policy 
determination that the court “should be receptive to and accord expedited 
treatment” to advancement claims.200  Indeed, if advancement is not made 
promptly, its benefit to a director is “forever lost” because the absence of 
prompt advancement will influence what counsel and litigation strategy the 
director can afford.201  Advancement cases are particularly appropriate, 
then, for “resolution on a paper record.”202
4.  The Relationship Between Indemnification and Advancement 
 
Although they are typically correlative, indemnification and advancement 
rights are legally separate and distinct.203  An extension of indemnification 
rights concomitantly extends the amount by which a corporation may be 
legally liable.204  A totally unrelated decision to advance expenses is, 
essentially, the decision to advance credit to a director.205
 
 194. E.g., Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212 (citing Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 
818 (Del. 1992)); id. (“Homestore’s bylaws contain[] a mandatory and unconditional 
advancement provision.”); see also infra Part I.B.5. 
  Thus, an 
 195. Robson, supra note 192, at 284; see also Fricke, 623 A.2d at 83 (“[M]ost 
corporations and virtually all public corporations have by bylaw exercised the authority 
recognized by Section 145 so as to mandate the extension of indemnification [and 
advancement] rights in circumstances in which indemnification [and advancement] would be 
permissible under Section 145.”). 
 196. See Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 197. Robson, supra note 192, at 306–07.  Nevertheless, directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance policies typically cover advancement expenses. See id. at 295. 
 198. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (2001). 
 199. See id. (“The Court of Chancery may summarily determine a corporation’s 
obligation to advance expenses (including attorneys’ fees).”); see also Weinstock v. Lazard 
Debt Recovery GP, LLP, No. 20048, 2003 WL 21843254, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2003) 
(stating that “summary judgment practice is an efficient and appropriate method” to decide 
most advancement disputes). 
 200. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2003). 
 201. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502, 505 (Del. 2005). 
 202. DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 1384, 2006 WL 224058, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
23, 2006).  Summary advancement proceedings are inappropriate, however, for litigating 
collateral indemnification or recoupment claims, which generally require more “detailed 
analysis.” Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 510 (Del. 2005). 
 203. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005) (citing Kaung, 884 A.2d 
at 509). 
 204. Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 205. Id. 
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advancement right is not dependent on an indemnification right,206 and a 
mandatory indemnification bylaw does not include an attendant 
advancement obligation before it has been determined that indemnification 
is proper.207
Furthermore, a director is only entitled to mandatory indemnification 
when he prevails “on the merits or otherwise” in defending a proceeding to 
be entitled to indemnification.
 
208  In contrast, section 145 evidently 
contemplates an advancement right greater than this mandatory 
indemnification right, as a director must repay expenses advanced when he 
is ineligible for indemnification.209
5.  The Scope of Mandatory Advancement Rights 
 
The prevalence of mandatory advancement bylaws has accordingly 
produced a “maddening” outcome in recent cases:  an unconditional 
corporate obligation to fund the legal defense of a director “the board 
believes has acted against the interests of the corporation or even 
criminally.”210  In a common scenario, the board has already “drawn harsh 
conclusions about the integrity and fidelity” of the director seeking 
advancement, and it may even have a “firm basis to believe [the director] 
intentionally injured the corporation.”211  Understandably, the board is 
reluctant to advance funds for his defense, “fearing that the funds will never 
be paid back and resisting the idea of seeing further depletion of corporate 
resources at the insistence of someone perceived to be a faithless 
fiduciary.”212
The Delaware Court of Chancery has asserted, however, that it is “no 
answer” that the corporation has come to believe that the director has been 
unfaithful.
 
213  Indeed, it is “in those very cases that the right to 
advancement attaches most strongly.”214  In fact, the court has criticized 
boards denying advancement, in one case sarcastically labeling them “sage 
businesspersons” seeking to escape “the consequences of their own 
contractual freedom.”215
 
 206. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 
818, 826 (Del. 1992) (holding that an indemnification agreement’s exclusion of violations of 
federal securities laws from indemnification had no impact on a director’s entitlement to 
advancement to defend such claims). 
  Previously content with mandatory advancement 
bylaws “drafted with holes large enough to drive a truck through,” suddenly 
the board resembles “a sinner who finally finds religion . . . insisting on a 
rigorous interpretation” of bylaws that only condition advancement on a 
 207. Fricke, 623 A.2d at 84. 
 208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2001). 
 209. See Fricke, 623 A.2d at 84. 
 210. McLaughlin, supra note 191 (citing Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467, 
2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002)). 
 211. Reddy, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Radiancy, Inc. v. Azar, No. 1547, 2006 WL 4762868, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006). 
 214. Id. 
 215. DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 1384, 2006 WL 224058, at *2, *13 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 23, 2006). 
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“hollow, worthless promise to repay.”216  Regretting the broad 
advancement right it “forged on a clear day,” the board requests that the 
court ignore the “plain language” of the bylaw to generate an “after-the-fact 
judicial contract that reflects [its] current preference.”217
Nonetheless, the court reminds recalcitrant boards that section 145 does 
not command that advancement provisions “be written broadly or in a 
mandatory fashion.”
 
218  Where an advancement bylaw is, “by its plain 
terms, expansively written and mandatory, it will be enforced as 
written.”219  It is not the court’s responsibility to “relieve sophisticated 
parties of the burdens of contracts they wish they had drafted 
differently.”220  A corporation that adopts a bylaw mandating 
unconditional, unsecured advancement “will be held to that decision and 
will be deemed to have waived the opportunity to examine whether the 
extension of credit to a particular [director] is in the corporation’s best 
interests” when the advance is requested.221  Indeed, the court “does not 
relish and will not perform the task of playground monitor, refereeing 
needless and inefficient skirmishes in the sandbox.”222
In sum, where a corporation could easily have drafted a mandatory 
advancement bylaw differently and did not, the board must “maintain its 
bargain” with its director.
 
223  Because a director’s typically high level of 
compensation would facilitate securing an undertaking for advancement, 
any excuse “falls woefully short” of explaining a board’s failure to require 
collateral.224  In fact, the court has held that denying advancement due 
would weaken section 145,225 thereby undermining the beneficial public 
policies it serves.226
 
 216. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 556733, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 
2004). 
  While stockholders regrettably “get it coming and 
 217. DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *2. 
 218. Id. at *13. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *2. 
 221. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability:  Indemnification Update, 
N.Y. L.J., June 12, 2008, at 5. 
 222. Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003, 2008 WL 868108, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008). 
 223. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2003). 
 224. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 3053129, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 
2004) (“People with far less substantial bank accounts than [directors] are required to post 
secured bonds every day in [the Court of Chancery].  For a [director] being paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars or more a year in salary and benefits, this Court is hard pressed to 
understand why it would be difficult to attract people to such positions if they were required 
to post a bond to secure the advancement of fees and costs related to litigation arising from 
their service in that capacity.”). 
 225. See Radiancy, Inc. v. Azar, No. 1547, 2006 WL 4762868, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 
2006). 
 226. See Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5–6 (Del. 
Ch. June 18, 2002). 
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going” in advancement actions,227 the Delaware Court of Chancery has 
categorically held that boards may not “unilaterally rescind” directors’ 
advancement rights.228
As a result, it is vital to understand the advancement entitlement that a 
mandatory advancement bylaw affords directors.  The following sections 
describe the circumstances in which advancement is available and the 
potential arguments of boards seeking to avoid their obligation to advance. 
 
a.  Covered Directors 
Section 145 authorizes indemnification in proceedings brought against a 
person “by reason of the fact” that the person is a corporate director.229  
Because a corporation may only advance potentially indemnifiable 
expenses, advancement is also only available in suits brought against a 
director due to her office.230
As a result, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that a mandatory 
advancement bylaw entitles a director to advancement where there is a 
“nexus or causal connection” between any of the underlying proceedings 
contemplated by section 145(e) and the director’s official corporate 
duties.
 
231  Such connection exists where the director’s corporate powers 
were utilized to commit the alleged misconduct.232  Indeed, a claim 
entitling a corporation to avoid advancement must clearly involve a 
contractual obligation without any such nexus or causal connection to 
official duties.233
Notably, a director’s motivation for engaging in misconduct is ultimately 
irrelevant to this analysis.
 
234  In fact, precedent upholds advancement to 
directors charged with serious misconduct even when this misconduct was 
allegedly inspired by “personal greed.”235
 
 227. Barrrett v. Am. Country Holdings, Inc., 951 A.2d 735, 746–47 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(noting that shareholder wealth ultimately bears the litigation expenses of both the director 
and the company). 
  To justify this result, the Court 
of Chancery has observed that it would be highly problematic if directors’ 
advancement rights depended on the motivation “ascribed to their conduct 
 228. Bergonzi, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3. 
 229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2001). 
 230. See, e.g., Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(describing a bylaw granting “broad and mandatory advancement rights to any covered 
person faced with ‘defending’ a ‘proceeding’ in which indemnification theoretically could be 
available”). 
 231. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 213–14 (Del. 2005) (citing Perconti v. 
Thornton Oil Corp., No. 18630, 2002 WL 982419, at *3–5 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002)); see also 
Perconti, 2002 WL 982419, at *6–8. 
 232. See Paolino, 985 A.2d at 406 (citing Bernstein v. TractManager, Inc., 953 A.2d 
1003, 1011 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 
 233. See id. at 407. 
 234. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 213–14. 
 235. Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 
18, 2002). 
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by the suing parties.”236  Otherwise, a director might not be able to defend, 
for example, a claim that she breached her duty of loyalty.237
b.  Covered Proceedings 
 
Section 145 authorizes advancement to directors “in defending” a 
contemplated proceeding.238  When a claim, counterclaim, or third party 
claim has been asserted against a director, she is defending that proceeding 
and is entitled to advancement.239  A director may also be defending against 
threatened claims when the board engages in discovery of the director in the 
director’s own claim against the corporation.240
Moreover, a director is entitled to advancement of the costs of both 
asserting affirmative defenses
 
241 and appealing a conviction.242  Asserting a 
counterclaim comprises defending when (1) the counterclaim would qualify 
as a compulsory counterclaim under Delaware and federal civil procedure, 
and (2) the counterclaim “so directly relates to a claim against a [director] 
such that success on the counterclaim would operate to defeat the 
affirmative claims” against the director.243  Furthermore, a director is 
entitled to advancement of fees to assert defamation claims as part of her 
litigation strategy.244
c.  Duration of Coverage 
 
A person is not automatically entitled to advancement rights upon 
becoming a director or even upon accrual of the cause of action for which 
advancement is sought.245  Rather, advancement rights vest “when the 
director is named in a proceeding for which advancement is available, or 
some firm indication exists (such as an investigation)” that the potential 
claimant is contemplating claims against the director.246
A corporation must provide advancement to a director until the 
underlying proceeding is resolved, “in the sense that its outcome is not 
subject to further disturbance.”
 
247
 
 236. See id. at *5. 
  Put simply, the advancement obligation 
 237. Id. (noting that if directors’ motivation influenced their advancement entitlement, 
directors would not be able to defend “claims that they took official action for the primary 
purpose of diverting corporate resources to their own pocketbooks”). 
 238. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 2010). 
 239. Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 400 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 240. Schoon v. Troy, 948 A.2d 1157, 1170 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 241. Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 824 (Del. 1992). 
 242. Sun-Times Media Grp., Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 398 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 243. Zaman v. Amedeo Holdings, Inc., No. 3115, 2008 WL 2168397, at *35–36 (Del. Ch. 
May 23, 2008) (“In other words, a counterclaim fits within the ‘in defending’ language if it 
defends the corporate official by directly responding to and negating the affirmative 
claim.”). 
 244. See Duthie v. CorSolutions Med., Inc., No. 3048, 2008 WL 4173850, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 10, 2008). 
 245. See McLaughlin, supra note 221 (citing Schoon, 948 A.2d at 1165–66). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Black, 954 A.2d at 395. 
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does not terminate until the non-appealable conclusion of a proceeding.248  
For example, a director who has entered a guilty plea before sentencing 
remains entitled to advancement, as his plea did not represent the 
proceedings’ final disposition.249
d.  Rejected Defenses 
 
In recent cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery has rejected several 
defenses raised by recalcitrant boards to excuse noncompliance with a 
mandatory advancement bylaw.  These include severe financial hardship250 
and a corporation’s inchoate recoupment claim.251  Even clear evidence that 
advanced expenses will not be indemnified—such as a director’s sworn 
admission to deliberate falsification of financial statements—does not 
comprise a valid excuse.252  A claim that the director fraudulently induced 
an employment agreement is equally unavailing, but the court has granted 
that the board may assert this claim in a separate action against the 
director.253
e.  The Potential Defense of Fiduciary Duty 
 
One novel defense that boards have not raised in defending advancement 
claims is that advancement in a particular instance would constitute a 
breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.  To this end, a board might claim that 
advancement represents gross mismanagement of corporate assets, 
amounting to a breach of the board’s duty of care.254  Alternatively, a board 
could argue that a decision to extend advancement to one of its member 
directors is a self-interested transaction in breach of the board’s duty of 
loyalty.255
While no advancement case in Delaware has yet considered this defense, 
an interesting string of decisions from federal courts in Pennsylvania and 
Delaware, and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, may shed some 
light on this defense’s viability before the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
 
 
 248. See id. at 397. 
 249. See Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *2 (Del Ch. Oct. 
20, 2003). 
 250. See Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 556733, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 
2004). 
 251. See Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 502 (Del. 2005) (holding that the 
summary nature of an advancement proceeding made hearing a counterclaim for recoupment 
inappropriate). 
 252. See Tafeen, 2004 WL 556733, at *4–5. 
 253. See Bergonzi, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3 (holding that a contract providing for 
advancement precludes an inquiry into whether claimant will qualify for indemnification). 
 254. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 255. Travis Laster, CA v. AFSCME:  The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the 
Supreme Court Taketh Away, DEALLAWYERS.COM BLOG (July 18, 2008, 7:29 AM), 
http://www.deallawyers.com/blog/archives/000924.html; see also supra notes 47–48 and 
accompanying text. 
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In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Felicetti,256 the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered claims of former 
directors of a Pennsylvania corporation to advancement under a mandatory 
advancement bylaw to defend claims asserted against them by the 
corporation.257  Granting that the advancement bylaw did not directly 
conflict with the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law’s advancement 
provision,258 the court found that the bylaw ran “contrary to the fiduciary 
obligations imposed upon directors” under Pennsylvania law and the 
bylaws.259  The bylaw could not supersede the overriding duty of the 
directors to act in the best interest of the corporation, which, the court 
determined, dictated that advancement be denied in this case.260  Thus, the 
corporation successfully avoided advancement to the former directors.261
Two years later, Ridder v. CityFed Financial Corp.
 
262 involved 
employees of a Delaware corporation seeking advancement under the 
corporation’s mandatory advancement bylaw to defend suits brought 
against them by the receiver of the parent corporation.263  The Third Circuit 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the court adopt the approach taken in 
Felicetti, concluding that it was required to follow the decisions of 
Delaware courts concerning issues of Delaware law.264  Moreover, the 
court found the reasoning in Felicetti unpersuasive because, the court 
asserted, “[r]arely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary duty . . . to 
comply with the requirements of the corporation’s by-laws, as expressly 
authorized by [section 145].”265
Only ten months later, in Neal v. Neumann Medical Center,
 
266 the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered the claims of former 
officers against a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation to enjoin the 
corporation’s suit against the officers until the corporation advanced the 
officers’ defense costs, pursuant to a mandatory advancement bylaw.267
 
 256. 830 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
  
The court declined to follow Felicetti, and instead adopted the Ridder 
 257. Id. at 263–65. 
 258. The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Act’s advancement provision is modeled in 
part on section 145 of the DGCL. See id. at 266 (“Most states have adopted legislation which 
is modeled after either the Delaware [General] Corporation Law . . . § 145, or the Model 
Business Corporation Act . . . .  Pennsylvania’s indemnification provision is a hybrid of the 
two.”); see also 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1745 (West Supp. 2011). 
 259. Felicetti, 830 F. Supp. at 268–69. 
 260. See id. at 269 (“In this case, the [directors] are backed into a corner by 
simultaneously being required by [the bylaws] to advance the expenses of this lawsuit to [the 
defendant directors] and being bound by their fiduciary duties to act only in the best interest 
of the corporation, actions which the directors have definitively decided are irreconcilable.”). 
 261. See id. at 269–70. 
 262. 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 263. Id. at 86. 
 264. See id. at 87. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 667 A.2d 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). 
 267. Id. at 480.  The Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Act’s advancement provision is 
modeled in part on section 145 of the DGCL. Id. at 484 (Smith, J., dissenting) (describing 
the advancement provision as “a hybrid between Delaware provisions and the Model 
Business Corp. Act”); see also 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5745 (West Supp. 2011). 
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court’s reasoning, asserting that “directors can only act in the corporation’s 
best interests by implementing the mandatory advancement provision, since 
the bylaws which contain it were presumably adopted for [the 
corporation’s] benefit.”268
Each of these decisions addresses whether a board’s compliance with a 
mandatory advancement bylaw may cause it to breach its fiduciary duties.  
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. that a mandatory bylaw 
is indeed invalid for that reason seems to set the stage for a board seeking to 
deny advancement to make the same argument. 
 
II.  TALKING OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF YOUR MOUTH:  
THE IMPACT OF CA, INC. ON MANDATORY ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS 
Part II analyzes the conflict between the CA, Inc. decision and the general 
enforceability of mandatory advancement bylaws.  First, it explores the 
parties’ arguments in CA, Inc. that compare the proposed bylaw in that case 
to mandatory advancement bylaws.  It then reviews commentary by 
relevant practitioners that discuss the CA, Inc. decision’s potential impact 
on mandatory advancement bylaws. 
A.  The Parties’ Arguments in CA, Inc. Recognize a Link 
It is telling that AFSCME, in its CA, Inc. brief, likened its proposed 
bylaw to mandatory advancement bylaws, whose validity is well 
established.269
First, AFSCME argued that valid bylaws may mandate payment of 
corporate funds without improperly interfering with the directors’ fiduciary 
duties.
  With respect to the second certified question, AFSCME 
advanced two arguments that drew on parallels to mandatory advancement 
bylaws. 
270  As an example, AFSCME pointed out that Delaware courts 
regularly enforce mandatory advancement bylaws.271  While section 145 
expressly authorizes advancement, it does not mandate advancement in any 
circumstance and remains silent with respect to the adoption of 
advancement bylaws.272  Nevertheless, virtually all public corporations 
guarantee advancement in their bylaws,273 and, where a mandatory 
advancement bylaw exists, such rights are enforced as a contract.274
Second, AFSCME argued that a mandatory bylaw cannot cause a board 
to violate its fiduciary duties because directors are not “called upon to 
exercise any discretion on the payment itself” where such a provision 
 
 
 268. Neal, 667 A.2d at 482 (majority opinion). 
 269. See generally Brief of Appellee at 27–39, CA, Inc. (No. 329, 2008). 
 270. See id. at 31. 
 271. Id. at 28 (citing Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982, 2008 WL 
2262316 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008); Orloff v. Shulman, No. 852, 2005 WL 5750635 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 23, 2005)). 
 272. Id. at 29 (citing VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 81 (Del. 1998)). 
 273. See id. at 30 (citing VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 81). 
 274. See id. at 30 (citing Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 
2001)). 
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exists.275  Again, AFSCME employed the example of mandatory 
advancement bylaws, which do not implicate the directors’ business 
judgment regarding the advancement decision.276  Instead, advancement in 
such cases is required, “just like the terms of any other contract.”277
In its reply brief, CA elected not to rebut these arguments directly.
 
278  In 
fact, CA only referred to mandatory advancement bylaws in its discussion 
of the first certified question,279 criticizing a citation in the opinion of 
AFSCME’s Delaware counsel enclosed as part of AFSCME’s response to 
CA’s no-action request.280  There, CA asserted that reliance on a case 
enforcing a mandatory advancement bylaw was inapposite because 
advancement is a matter that section 145 “specifically provides may be 
regulated” by law, whereas AFSCME’s proposed bylaw lacked express 
statutory authorization.281
The Delaware Supreme Court clearly held in CA, Inc. that a bylaw is 
invalid if it mandates corporate expenditures in circumstances where a 
proper application of fiduciary principles might preclude such payments, 
and that a fiduciary out provision could cure this defect.
 
282  Following the 
CA, Inc. decision, however, the Delaware General Assembly acted to 
nullify CA’s argument that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw ought not to be 
treated like valid mandatory advancement bylaws.283  DGCL section 113 
now specifically authorizes corporations to adopt mandatory proxy expense 
reimbursement bylaws,284 placing AFSCME’s proposed bylaw and 
mandatory advancement bylaws adopted pursuant to DGCL section 145 on 
equivalent statutory footing.285  In fact, absent this distinction, AFSCME’s 
argument that mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaws and 
mandatory advancement bylaws occupy the same legal status seems 
persuasive indeed.286
These points lead to one inevitable conclusion.  Where mandatory 
advancement bylaws are valid and enforceable without fiduciary outs, then 
mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaws must also be valid without 
fiduciary outs.  In the CA, Inc. decision, however, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that a mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw lacking a 
 
 
 275. Id. at 37. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See generally Brief of Appellant, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 
A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (No. 329, 2008). 
 279. Id. at 37. 
 280. See G & E Opinion, supra note 108, at 4 (citing Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787 
A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 2001)). 
 281. Brief of Appellant, supra note 278, at 37 & n.21 (arguing that section 145 is a 
“statutory exception to the general rule” of board discretion under section 141(a)). 
 282. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. 
 283. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text (describing the new section 113 of 
the DGCL). 
 284. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 113 (Supp. 2010). 
 285. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e). 
 286. See supra notes 270–78 and accompanying text. 
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fiduciary out is invalid and unenforceable.  It follows that a mandatory 
advancement bylaw without a fiduciary out must be invalid as well. 
B.  Practitioner Commentary Analyzes the Implications 
Two accounts interpreting CA, Inc.’s impact on mandatory advancement 
bylaws are particularly valuable in interpreting this conflict.  The first is an 
article by AFSCME’s Delaware counsel that details the CA, Inc. case.287  
There, the authors highlight the Delaware Supreme Court’s perceived 
failure to (1) distinguish the legal status of mandatory advancement bylaws 
from AFSCME’s proposed proxy expense reimbursement bylaw, and (2) to 
explain why CA, Inc.’s holding would not disturb mandatory advancement 
bylaws.288
Absent this explanation, the authors are left to speculate:  if a bylaw 
cannot require mandatory reimbursement of proxy expenses without a 
fiduciary out, “how can a bylaw require mandatory advancement of 
expenses without a fiduciary out?  And, if a fiduciary out is necessary, 
[thereby permitting a board to avoid mandatory advancement,] is there 
really such a thing as mandatory advancement of expenses after CA, 
Inc.?”
 
289  In light of this ambiguity, the authors contend that “many 
directors now fear that their protection of ‘mandatory’ advancement of 
expenses is now subject to the Board’s fiduciary duty at the time of the 
request.”290
The second relevant commentary is that of Travis Laster, a Vice 
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery who analyzed the CA, Inc. 
decision before taking the bench.
 
291  Echoing AFSCME’s counsel, Laster 
observed that CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement represents a “fiduciary 
trump card,” with the result that mandatory bylaws “may no longer be 
mandatory.”292
According to Laster, litigation over mandatory advancement represents 
the most obvious situation in which a conflict between fiduciary duties and 
a mandatory bylaw can arise.
 
293
 
 287. Stuart M. Grant & John C. Kairis, Shareholder Proposals for Reimbursement of 
Expenses Incurred in Proxy Contests:  Recent Guidance from the Delaware Supreme Court, 
in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
2009, at 519, 526–33 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 19172, 
2009), WL 1740 PLI/Corp 519.  Grant and Kairis are Directors of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. 
and served as counsel to AFSCME in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan. 
  Of course, courts have enforced 
mandatory advancement bylaws even where a board “believes the recipient 
[director] is a bad actor and that it would be a breach of the board’s duties 
 288. See id. at 534–35. 
 289. Id. at 534. 
 290. Id. at 535. 
 291. See Laster, supra note 255.  Laster was sworn in as Vice Chancellor of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery on October 9, 2009. Court of Chancery Judicial Officers, DEL. ST. CTS., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (select “J. Travis 
Laster” tab). 
 292. See Laster, supra note 255. 
 293. See id. 
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to provide the advancements.”294  Nevertheless, CA, Inc.’s prescribed 
fiduciary out serves to restore broad discretion to the board whenever 
circumstances implicate its fiduciary duties.295
Laster envisions two scenarios occurring at a corporation that has 
adopted a mandatory advancement bylaw with a fiduciary out.
 
296  First, the 
board elects to advance a particular expense, either confident that its 
fiduciary duties dovetail with the bylaw, or uncertain of what decision its 
fiduciary duties require and hesitant to violate the bylaw.297  Following CA, 
Inc., directors that act in reliance on a mandatory bylaw can be “second-
guessed” on the ground that their fiduciary duties actually required them not 
to advance.298  Thus, a board’s decision to advance despite a fiduciary out 
will, predictably, expose the board to breach of fiduciary duty actions by 
shareholders.299
Alternatively, the board may deny advancement, arguing that a 
mandatory advancement bylaw cannot preclude operation of its fiduciary 
duties, and that it therefore has the discretion to avoid the obligation to 
advance.
 
300  Indeed, Laster predicts that the next development in 
advancement jurisprudence will feature boards making this very claim.301  
While this argument was not, in fact, viable under advancement 
jurisprudence before the CA, Inc. decision, Laster posits that it could be 
asserted in good faith following CA, Inc.302
Ultimately, Laster expects that Delaware courts will “find a way” to 
uphold mandatory advancement bylaws.
 
303  He points out, however, that 
reaching such a result will require that courts distinguish advancement 
actions from CA, Inc., without specifying how this can be achieved.304
III.  CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE:  THE CONTINUING VALIDITY 
OF MANDATORY ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS 
  One 
expects that Laster, as Vice Chancellor, will play an instrumental role in 
crafting the Delaware Court of Chancery’s approach to this conflict. 
As detailed in Part II, the Delaware Supreme Court’s extension of anti-
precommitment doctrine to invalidate a mandatory proxy expense 
 
 294. Id. 
 295. Ursaner, supra note 96, at 507. 
 296. See Laster, supra note 255. 
 297. See id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Ursaner, supra note 96, at 507 (characterizing such actions as claims the board 
“otherwise would not be subject to”). 
 300. Laster, supra note 255. But see supra Part I.B.5.e (discussing this argument in the 
context of the Felicetti-Ridder-Neal line of cases). 
 301. See Travis Laster, Rock Bottom:  Here We Come…, THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET 
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2008, 6:40 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2008/10/rock-
bottom-here-we-come.html (under Despite Conviction:  Advancement Rights Continue 
Through Appeal). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Laster, supra note 255. 
 304. See id. 
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reimbursement bylaw in CA, Inc.305 has also purportedly nullified 
mandatory advancement bylaws306 that the Court of Chancery has 
consistently enforced.307
In light of CA, Inc.’s requirement that mandatory bylaws include 
fiduciary out provisions, boards that advance directors’ litigation expenses 
will do so at their peril, exposing themselves to fresh breach of duty 
claims.
  Part III first suggests that amendments mandating 
advancement to either the DGCL or a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation would protect mandatory advancement in the event the CA, 
Inc. decision invalidates mandatory advancement bylaws.  It continues by 
proposing that the standard of review that the Delaware Supreme Court 
employed in CA, Inc. reveals a reason that the CA, Inc. decision will not 
render mandatory advancement bylaws invalid. 
308  The risk of shareholder litigation will discourage boards from 
granting advances even when their fiduciary duties permit advancement, 
effectively gutting the mandatory aspect of mandatory advancement 
bylaws.309
Denying advancement also presents the board with a litigation risk in the 
form of claims to enforce mandatory advancement bylaws by directors 
seeking advancement.
 
310  Here, CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement 
appears to provide recalcitrant boards an excuse from their obligations:  that 
advancement in a particular case would breach their fiduciary duties.311
Assuming that the CA, Inc. holding does, in fact, implicate the validity of 
mandatory advancement bylaws under Delaware law, the question this Note 
seeks to address is how boards should act (1) to protect their advancement 
entitlement as currently recognized under Delaware law, and (2) to 
minimize the risk of litigation resulting from their decisions in the 
advancement sphere.  This Note suggests that an amendment to the DGCL 
or to a given corporation’s certificate of incorporation would each serve to 
restore the mandatory nature of advancement bylaws. 
 
Nevertheless, this Note also intends to refute the assumption that the CA, 
Inc. holding, by itself, renders invalid mandatory advancement bylaws 
lacking fiduciary outs.  Because the CA, Inc. case reached the court by 
certification, the court employed a standard of review that took into account 
the entirety of Delaware precedent, a circumstance that is not ordinarily 
present in advancement actions.312  The CA, Inc. court was bound to 
invalidate the proposed mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw by 
precedent dictating that a board’s compliance with such a bylaw would, in 
certain circumstances, comprise a breach of its fiduciary duties.313
 
 305. See supra Parts I.A.4–5. 
 
 306. See supra Part II.B. 
 307. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 308. See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, advancement actions before the Delaware Court of Chancery 
ordinarily present the court with a set of facts upon which to apply the 
Delaware law.314
No Delaware precedent holds that advancement pursuant to a mandatory 
advancement bylaw constitutes a breach of the board’s fiduciary duty.
  Nonetheless, even if a particular advancement case 
demanded the rigorous standard of review employed in CA, Inc., the court 
would still not invalidate the mandatory advancement bylaw at issue. 
315  
Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery has upheld directors’ advancement 
rights and enforced mandatory advancement bylaws in even the most 
egregious cases.316
Thus, the requirement to include fiduciary outs in mandatory 
advancement bylaws will not gut their mandatory nature.  Instead, these 
mandatory advancement bylaws will effectively disable the escape hatch of 
fiduciary outs. 
  Because no set of facts has dictated such a result in the 
past, precedent does not compel invalidation if a certified question were to 
present this issue in the future.  Moreover, given the court’s enforcement of 
mandatory advancement bylaws in the most egregious cases, it seems 
unlikely that the court will find itself confronted with a case whose facts 
demand such a result. 
A.  Boards Should Protect Advancement by Amending Certificates 
of Incorporation 
In the CA, Inc. decision, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that 
AFSCME’s proposed mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw 
could only be valid under Delaware law if:  (1) the proposed bylaw 
included a fiduciary out provision; (2) the CA, Inc. certificate of 
incorporation was amended to allow such a restriction on the board’s 
powers; or (3) the Delaware General Assembly amended the DGCL to 
expressly permit such a bylaw.317
Thus, the first step directors can take to secure their advancement 
entitlements is to amend their corporations’ certificates of incorporation to 
mandate advancement to directors to the full extent of Delaware law. 
 
CA, Inc. purportedly requires mandatory advancement bylaws to include 
fiduciary outs because mandatory advancement bylaws otherwise 
impermissibly constrain a board’s ability to exercise its fiduciary duties.  
Nevertheless, section 102(b)(1) of the DGCL dictates that restrictions on a 
board’s managerial authority are permissible so long as they appear in the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation.318
Therefore, a board may certainly precommit to a mandatory advancement 
policy without implicating its fiduciary duties if it amends the corporation’s 
 
 
 314. Cf. supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 316. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 317. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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certificate of incorporation to that effect.319
B.  The Delaware General Assembly Should Protect Advancement 
by Amending the DGCL 
  This strategy would ultimately 
preserve advancement rights to the full extent permitted under Delaware 
law while also protecting directors from the claim that an advance breached 
their fiduciary duties. 
The second step directors can take to secure advancement entitlements is 
to encourage the Delaware General Assembly to amend section 145 of the 
DGCL to mandate advancement to the full extent of Delaware decisional 
law.  Section 145 contemplates a liberal advancement regime to serve a 
number of salutary public policies.320  As a result, Delaware courts have 
interpreted and enforced mandatory advancement bylaws to craft expansive 
advancement rights.321  Because a board may attempt to deny advancement 
after CA, Inc. given the fiduciary out requirement, the Delaware General 
Assembly may find it necessary to mandate advancement in the DGCL to 
shore up the public policies that advancement supports.  In light of section 
145(c)’s mandate of indemnification,322
C.  Why CA, Inc. Ultimately Leaves Mandatory Advancement Bylaws Intact 
 a mandate of advancement will 
likely support these beneficial policies as well. 
The preceding two proposals presume that directors will use CA, Inc.’s 
fiduciary out requirement to avoid their advancement obligations.  In other 
words, these approaches are advisable given that boards will capably 
demonstrate that their fiduciary duties in fact preclude advancement.  This 
assumption overlooks a crucial difference, however, that distinguishes 
bylaws mandating advancement from those mandating proxy expense 
reimbursement.  This difference ultimately protects directors’ advancement 
entitlement from the exercise of fiduciary outs. 
Because CA, Inc. reached the Delaware Supreme Court via certification, 
the case lacked a factual record upon which to apply Delaware law.323  
Under ordinary circumstances, the court would have considered the parties’ 
evidence and decided whether a particular reimbursement of proxy 
expenses precluded the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties.324  In CA, 
Inc., however, the court had to consider whether the proposed bylaw’s 
mandate to reimburse proxy expenses would preclude the board’s exercise 
of its fiduciary duties in any possible circumstance.325
 
 319. This approach requires that both the board and a majority of shareholders approve 
the proposed amendment to the certificate. See supra note 
  Ultimately, the court 
found that the bylaw would indeed interfere with the board’s fiduciary 
duties in one specific scenario—when the proxy contest was motivated by 
153. 
 320. See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 322. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
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personal or petty concerns.326  Under this precedent, the Delaware Supreme 
Court was bound to hold that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw, if adopted, 
would cause CA to violate Delaware law,327 and that a fiduciary out would 
be sufficient to cure this flaw.328
The critical difference between bylaws mandating proxy expense 
reimbursement and those mandating advancement is that the Delaware 
Court of Chancery has never found that a board’s obligation to advance 
pursuant to a mandatory bylaw actually precludes the exercise of the 
board’s fiduciary duties.
 
329  CA, Inc. correctly presumes that a fiduciary out 
will impact a proxy expense reimbursement bylaw precisely because the 
proper exercise of fiduciary duties will preclude a board from reimbursing 
proxy expenses in a proxy contest based on personal or petty concerns.  
Nevertheless, the Delaware Court of Chancery has never recognized a 
factual context in which a mandatory advancement bylaw would, in fact, 
constrain the board’s ability to exercise its fiduciary duties.330
This difference is significant because a board denying advancement will 
not be able to argue successfully, as the law currently stands, that its 
fiduciary duties preclude advancement.  Indeed, even where a director has 
pled guilty to an offense that would render him ineligible for 
indemnification, the court has enforced his advancement rights.
 
331
In even the most unfavorable case, then, it seems clear that an intractable 
board could not successfully claim that its fiduciary duties preclude 
advancement.  Because boards will not be able to avoid the obligation to 
advance, CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement will have no effect on the 
validity and enforceability of mandatory advancement bylaws. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Employees Pension Plan invalidated a proposed bylaw mandating proxy 
expense reimbursement because compliance with the bylaw in one scenario 
would cause the board to breach its fiduciary duties.  The CA, Inc. decision 
thereby extended Delaware jurisprudence against precommitment 
arrangements that prevent directors from fully discharging their duties to 
shareholders. 
The CA, Inc. court suggested that inclusion of fiduciary out provisions 
would render mandatory bylaws valid, but this requirement might also 
permit boards to escape their obligation to advance defendant directors’ 
legal expenses under mandatory advancement bylaws. 
Nonetheless, boards will not succeed in exercising fiduciary outs to deny 
advancement because the Delaware Court of Chancery recognizes no 
situation where advancement would actually breach directors’ fiduciary 
 
 326. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra Part I.B.5. 
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duties.  While corporations and the Delaware General Assembly may act to 
protect directors’ advancement rights, the CA, Inc. decision itself does not 
disturb mandatory advancement bylaws. 
 
